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 DE RUFHGV #0460/01 3171303
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
 O 131300Z NOV 83 ZFF4
 FM USMISSION GENEVA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8650
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0178
 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6851
 RUFHDL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2362
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1456
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, INF

SUBJECT: INF: NITZE/KVITSINSKIY MEETING, SUNDAY,
 - NOVEMBER 13, 1983

1. THIS IS INF-727. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.
2. KVITSINSKIY TELEPHONED NITZE AT APPROXIMATELY 2300 HOURS ON NOVEMBER 12 AND REQUESTED A PRIVATE MEETING ON SUNDAY AS EARLY AS WOULD BE CONVENIENT FOR NITZE. NITZE SUGGESTED 0900. KVITSINSKIY REPLIED THAT 1000 HOURS WOULD BE MORE CONVENIENT FOR HIM; THEY THEN AGREED TO MEET AT 10:00 AM IN THE PARK ACROSS FROM THE BOTANIC BUILDING. BELOW IS THE REPORT OF THAT MEETING.
3. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM MOSCOW DIRECTING HIM TO SEE NITZE IMMEDIATELY; IT WAS FOR THAT REASON HE HAD TELEPHONED NITZE SO LATE ON THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 12. HE WAS DIRECTED TO SAY THAT MOSCOW HAD STUDIED WITH CARE KVITSINSKIY'S REPORT OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT KVITSINSKIY AND NITZE HAD HAD ON THE SUBJECT OF EQUAL REDUCTIONS. THE TELEGRAM OFFICIALLY AUTHORIZED KVITSINSKIY TO TELL NITZE THAT IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE TO PROPOSE EQUAL REDUCTIONS OF 572 ON EACH SIDE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEPT THAT PROPOSAL AND THAT IT WAS MOSCOW'S VIEW THAT THE REMAINING ISSUED COULD BE EQUITABLY WORKED OUT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IN AN APPROPRIATE FUTURE NEGOTIATING FORUM.
4. THE OTHER POINT HE WAS DIRECTED TO MAKE WAS THAT IF THE U.S. PROCEEDED WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD "CEASE." NITZE WAS URGED TO TRANSMIT THE ABOVE TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND REQUEST AN EARLY ANSWER. (KVITSINSKIY WOULD NOT CLARIFY WHAT THE

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WORD "CEASE" MEANT; HE SAID THAT WAS THE WORD HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO USE.)

5. NITZE ASKED KVITSINSKIY WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN MOSCOW'S PROPOSAL WAS EQUAL REDUCTIONS OR SPECIFICALLY EQUAL REDUCTIONS BY 572 TO ZERO ON THE U.S. SIDE. KVITSINSKIY SAID IT WAS THE LATTER. NITZE ASKED WHETHER IN REPORTING KVITSINSKIY'S AND NITZE'S PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO MOSCOW THAT THE IDEA HAD BEEN KVITSINSKIY'S AND THAT NITZE HAD SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO WASHINGTON. KVITSINSKIY DIDN'T GIVE NITZE A CLEAR ANSWER.

6. NITZE ASKED KVITSINSKIY WHETHER THE NUMBER OF SS-20 SYSTEMS THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE TO COME DOWN TO IN EUROPE WAS 120. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE HAD MENTIONED "AROUND 120" IN HIS PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH NITZE. MEDVEDEV TOLD HIM THAT THE CORRECT FIGURE WAS 122 (OR 128 IF ONE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE 18 G CLASS SLBM'S.)

7. KVITSINSKIY ASKED NITZE HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE FOR HIM TO GET ANSWER. NITZE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW; THE PRESIDENT WAS IN THE FAR EAST. KVITSINSKIY SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON ON MONDAY. NITZE SAID IN ANY CASE HE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHEN HE WOULD RECEIVE AN ANSWER.

8. KVITSINSKIY ASKED NITZE WHAT HE THOUGHT WASHINGTON'S VIEWS WOULD BE. NITZE SAID THAT KVITSINSKIY WOULD RECALL THAT WHEN KVITSINSKIY HAD RAISED THE SUGGESTION BEFORE, NITZE HAD SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE U.S. REACTION WOULD BE NEGATIVE; NOTHING HAD HAPPENED SINCE THEN TO CHANGE HIS VIEW.

9. NITZE CONTINUED THAT HE THOUGHT IT CERTAIN THAT WASHINGTON WOULD NOT CONVERT A SOVIET PROPOSAL INTO A U.S. PROPOSAL. AT A MINIMUM THAT SUGGESTION SHOULD BE CONVERTED INTO THE IDEA THAT WASHINGTON AUTHORIZE NITZE TO NEGOTIATE A PACKAGE WITH KVITSINSKIY TO INCLUDE NOT ONLY EQUAL REDUCTIONS BUT ALSO ASIA RESTRAINTS, AIRCRAFT, SRINF COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS AND "ADDITIONAL MEASURES." KVITSINSKIY COMMENTED THAT NITZE HAD NEVER FILLED OUT THE U.S. AIRCRAFT PROPOSAL. NITZE SAID IT COULD BE WORKED OUT. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REPEAT THEIR POSITION RE AIRCRAFT AND ASIAN CONSTRAINTS WHICH REMAINED UNCHANGED. NITZE SAID THE SIDES WOULD ALSO HAVE TO DEAL WITH "ADDITIONAL MEASURES" RE VERIFICATION. KVITSINSKIY REPEATED THAT ALL THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE NEGOTIABLES.

10. NITZE ASKED KVITSINSKIY WHETHER HE HAD READ THAT MORNING'S LONDON SUNDAY TIMES. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE HAD NOT. NITZE DESCRIBED THE ARTICLE WHICH SAID THE

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FIRST MISSILES WOULD ARRIVE ON TUESDAY. KVITSINSKIY ASKED WHETHER WHAT IT SAID WAS SO. NITZE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW. KVITSINSKIY SAID WASHINGTON SHOULD TELL LONDON TO DELAY.

11. KVITSINSKIY RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. HE SAID THAT IN THE

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"FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS" CREDIT WOULD BE GIVEN NATO FOR THE 122 SS-20'S THE USSR WOULD HAVE MAINTAINED IN EUROPE. NITZE SAID THAT IN OTHER WORDS THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD CONSIDER THE 122 SS-20'S AS ONLY "PARTIAL COMPENSATION." HOWEVER, HE ASSUMED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REFERENCE WHATEVER TO BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IN THE AGREEMENT. KVITSINSKIY CONCURRED.

12. COMMENT:

A) IT IS PROBABLE SOVIETS WILL USE THIS INITIATIVE IN THEIR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND IN PARTICULAR IN CONNECTION WITH THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE. THEIR MAIN THRUST MAY BE THAT BY DELINKING THE BRITISH AND FRENCH ISSUE THEY HAVE MADE A FURTHER MAJOR MOVE. IF WE HAVE REJECTED THE PROPOSAL, OR HAVE CONTINUED DEPLOYMENTS WITHOUT A RESPONSE, THEY WILL HAVE POSITIONED THEMSELVES TO INTERRUPT THE NEGOTIATIONS AFTER HAVING MADE THE LAST TWO SIGNIFICANT MOVES. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES COULD BE SERIOUS IF THE U.S. HAS NOT INFORMED AND CONSULTED WITH BONN PRIOR TO THE SOVIETS INFORMING KOHL OR THE SPD.

B) IF UK PROCEEDS ON SCHEDULE WITH MISSILE DEPLOYMENT ON NOVEMBER 15, THE SOVIETS WILL BE FACED WITH A PROBLEM. THEY WILL EITHER HAVE TO "CEASE" THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS OR TOLERATE MISSILE DELIVERIES TO UK. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT BESMERTNYK IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID SOVIETS COULD TOLERATE "A FEW" CRUISE MISSILES IN ENGLAND. NITZE
END OF MESSAGE

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